WIDE Technical-Report in 2006

Configuring IPsec for SHISA/MIPL

wide-tr-nautilus6-configuring-ipsec-for-shisa-mipl-00.pdf



If you have any comments on this document, please contact to ad@wide.ad.jp

Configuring IPsec for SHISA/MIPL

Keiichi Shima <keiichi@iijlab.net>

June 1, 2006

Abstract

In this memo, we describe the step-by-step configuration of IPsec database for SHISA Mobility Stack.

TODO

- From Guillaume: Configuration sample to protect all traffic.
- From Guillaume: You should also mention HAAD messages and how it is possible to protect them or not.
- From Guillaume: For a deployment point of view, it is better to disable HAAD and MPS/ MPA messages. Do you think it is possible why SHISA ? I think that it is especially useful for what will be achieved with the website.

1 Introduction

It is always said that IPsec is awful. Regardless of the fact, we use IPsec in various places to provide security and privacy. Mobile IPv6 [?] is one of such protocols. To configure the IPsec parameters when using Mobile IPv6, you need to understand what traffic should be protected and how to set necessary parameters on your operating system. In this document, we will explain the procedure in the step-by-step manner. The target implementation is SHISA [?] that is built on top of the KAME IPv6 stack and works on FreeBSD and NetBSD.

2 Sample Network Configuration


Figure 1 is the sample network we assume in this document.

The home network prefix is 2001:db8:0:1000::/64, the address of the home agent (HA) is 2001:db8:0:1000::1 and the home address (HoA) of the mobile node (MN) is 2001:db8:0:1000::4649.

3 Protection Level

We can have several protection levels when using IPsec with Mobile IPv6. The following traffic can be protected.

1. Binding Update/Binding Acknowledgment messages



Mobile Node HoA: 2001:db8:0:1000::4649

Figure 1: The sample network

- 2. Mobile Prefix Solicitation (MPS)/Mobile Prefix Advertisement messages (MPA)
- 3. Normal traffic between MN and HA
- 4. Home Test Init (HoTI)/Home Test messages (HoT)
- 5. All tunneled normal traffic between MN and a correspondent node (CN)

In this memo, we will show the sample configuration to protect 1, 2 and 4.

4 Implementation Assumption

In this document we use the following implementation:

- FreeBSD5.4-RELEASE or NetBSD2.0
- The KAME snap kit that matches the above OSes

Although we use the above systems, the general description of how we should configure IPsec may be applied to other operating systems.

5 Security Parameters

In this memo, we use the following configuration.

IPsec protection mode We use the transport mode IPsec between MN and HA to protect Binding Update/Binding Acknowledgment messages and Mobile Prefix Solicitation/Advertisement messages.

We use the tunnel mode IPsec between MN and HA to protect Home Test Init/Home Test messages.

Security Association Security Association (SA) represents a secure data path from one node to the other node. In this example, we use 4 SAs, 2 for transport mode communication and 2 for tunnel mode communication. Table 1 shows the parameters for transport mode SAs and Table 2 shows those of tunnel mode SAs. The unique identifier defined in the tunnel mode SA is used to bind to the security policy to protect HoTI and HoT.

Transport mode. MIN to TIA	
Source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
IPsec protocol	esp (Encapsulating Security Payload)
SPI	1000
Encryption Algorithm	des-cbc
Encryption Key	MNHAtran
Authentication Algorithm	hmac-sha1
Authentication Key	MNHAtransportMNHAtra

Transport mode: MN to HA

Transport mode: HA to MN	
Source	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
IPsec protocol	esp (Encapsulating Security Payload)
SPI	1001
Encryption Algorithm	des-cbc
Encryption Key	HAMNtran
Authentication Algorithm	hmac-sha1
Authentication Key	HAMNtransportHAMNtra

Table 1: Parameters of transport mode SAs

The encryption algorithms and the authentication algorithms can be chosen from all available algorithms which kernel supports (see the **setkey(8)** manual page). Each algorithm has a restriction in its key length. In **des-cbc** case, the key length is 64 bits. The key length of **hmac-sha1** is 160 bits. When using other algorithms, you have to take care the restriction of the key length.

In theory, we can use different algorithms for each SA. However, in this example we use the same encryption and authentication algorithms for all SAs.

SPI value is a 32 bits integer which is bound to a particular SA. The value must be unique in a node. Note that the value from 0 to 254 is reserved by IANA for future use. We cannot use the reserved range.

Security Policy Security Policy (SP) specifies the packet template to decide whether the incoming/outgoing packet should be processed by the IPsec stack. In this example, we protect all Mobility Header (MH) messages exchanged, MPS/MPA messages, and tunneled HoTI and HoT messages between MN and HA.

Table 3 shows the parameters of SP entries to protect MH messages on MN.

Table 4 shows the parameters of SP entries to protect MPS/MPA messages on MN.

Tunnel mode: MN to HA	
Source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
IPsec protocol	esp (Encapsulating Security Payload)
SPI	1002
Unique Identifier	1002
Encryption Algorithm	des-cbc
Encryption Key	MNHAtunn
Authentication Algorithm	hmac-sha1
Authentication Key	MNHAtunnelMNHAtunnel

Tunnel mode: HA to MN Source 2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA) Destination 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA) IPsec protocol esp (Encapsulating Security Payload) SPI 1003 Unique Identifier 1003 Encryption Algorithm des-cbc Encryption Key HAMNtunn Authentication Algorithm hmac-sha1 Authentication Key HAMNtunnelHAMNtunnel

Table 2: Parameters of tunnel mode SAs

Table 5 shows the parameters of SP entries to protect HoTI/HoT messages on MN.

The similar policies should be installed on HA. We omit the description of these SP entries for HA, since it is easy to understand by looking at the actual configuration file provided in Section 6

6 Configuration Files

In this section, we show the actual configuration file for the **setkey(8)** command based on the parameters discussed in previous sections.

The configuration file described in Figure 2 installs SAs. These SAs must be installed on both MN and HA.

The configuration file described in Figure3 installs SPs on MN.

The configuration file described in Figure 4 installs SPs on HA.

1 Totection of outgoing will messages	
Source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
Upper Layer Protocol	135 (MH)
Direction	out (Outbound)
IPsec protocol	esp
IPsec mode	transport
IPsec processing level	require (Must be protected)

Protection of outgoing MH messages

Protection of incoming MH messages	
2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)	
2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)	
135 (MH)	
in (Inbound)	
esp	
transport	
require (Must be protected)	

Table 3: SP parameters to protect MH messages for MN

Source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
Upper Layer Protocol	ipv6-icmp or 58 (ICMPv6)
ICMPv6 type	146 (MPS)
Direction	out (Outbound)
IPsec protocol	esp
IPsec mode	transport
IPsec processing level	require (Must be protected)

Protection of outgoing MPS messages

Protection of incoming MPA messages

	0
Source	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Upper Layer Protocol	ipv6-icmp or 58 (ICMPv6)
ICMPv6 type	147 (MPA)
Direction	in (Inbound)
IPsec protocol	esp
IPsec mode	transport
IPsec processing level	require (Must be protected)


Table 4: SP parameters to protect MPS/MPA messages for MN

Protection of outgoing HoTI messages


Source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Destination	::/0 (any)
Upper Layer Protocol	135 (MH)
MH type	1 (HoTI)
Direction	out (Outbound)
IPsec protocol	esp
IPsec mode	tunnel
Tunnel source	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA, which will be updated to CoA)
Tunnel destination	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
IPsec processing level	require (Must be protected)
SA identifier	1002 (Unique ID)
Protection of incoming HoT messages	
Source	::/0 (any)
Destination	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA)
Upper Layer Protocol	135 (MH)
MH type	3 (HoT)
Direction	in (Inbound)
IPsec protocol	esp
IPsec mode	tunnel
Tunnel source	2001:db8:0:1000::1 (HA)
Tunnel destination	2001:db8:0:1000::4649 (HoA, which will be updated to CoA)
IPsec processing level	require (Must be protected)
SA identifier	1003 (Unique ID)

Table 5: SP parameters to protect HoTI/HoT messages for MN $\,$

```
add 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
        esp 1000
        -m transport
        -E des-cbc "MNHAtran"
        -A hmac-sha1 "MNHAtransportMNHAtra";
add 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
        esp 1001
        -m transport
        -E des-cbc "HAMNtran"
        -A hmac-sha1 "HAMNtransportHAMNtra";
add 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
        esp 1002
        -m tunnel
        -u 1002
        -E des-cbc "MNHAtunn"
        -A hmac-sha1 "MNHAtunnelMNHAtunnel";
add 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
        esp 1003
        -m tunnel
        -u 1003
        -E des-cbc "HAMNtunn"
        -A hmac-sha1 "HAMNtunnelHAMNtunnel";
```



```
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
        135 -P out ipsec
        esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
       135 -P in ipsec
        esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
       ipv6-icmp 146 -P out ipsec
        esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
        ipv6-icmp 147 -P in ipsec
       esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 ::/0
       135 1 -P out ipsec
       esp/tunnel/2001:db8:0:1000::4649-2001:db8:0:1000::1/unique:1002;
spdadd ::/0 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
       135 3 -P in ipsec
       esp/tunnel/2001:db8:0:1000::1-2001:db8:0:1000::4649/unique:1003;
```



```
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
       135 -P out ipsec
       esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
       135 -P in ipsec
       esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::1 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
       ipv6-icmp 147 -P out ipsec
       esp/transport//require;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 2001:db8:0:1000::1
       ipv6-icmp 146 -P in ipsec
       esp/transport//require;
spdadd ::/0 2001:db8:0:1000::4649
       135 3 -P out ipsec
       esp/tunnel/2001:db8:0:1000::1-2001:db8:0:1000::4649/unique:1003;
spdadd 2001:db8:0:1000::4649 ::/0
       135 1 -P in ipsec
       esp/tunnel/2001:db8:0:1000::4649-2001:db8:0:1000::1/unique:1002;
```

Figure 4: Configuration file to install SPs on HA